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Response
James W. Laine
Whatever criticisms I might have must come after an expression of 
real appreciation of the depth of scholarship and real insight clearly 
manifest in Professor Cady’s address. My comments here will only 
open a few areas for further reflection among the many that we might 
consider.
I want to divide my response into two parts; a response first to her 
diagnosis of the issue and then to her proposed cure.
I. Diagnosis
I am in sympathy and accord with Cady’s primary analysis, espe-
cially her portrayal of secularism as a powerful discourse that is often 
masked as a kind of reasonable natural arena, a neutral ground we 
can all share, regardless of our religious commitments. That neutral 
ground can be defended as a space free of religion, the sort of dis-
course the French call laïcité and Cady references as “laicist secular-
ism.” Or it can be a place where a vaguely Protestant system of values 
that all of us “regular folks” can accept is democratically supported by 
the majority without resorting to the establishment of any particular 
sect or church.
This second version now assumes a kind of unspecific Judeo-Chris-
tian civic religion, or even a broader inclusivist natural religion of good 
people everywhere. Both of these versions of secularism assume the 
supremacy of the nation-state over the church. The modern nation-
state, coming into existence in sixteenth-century Europe, struggled 
mightily and violently to gain political supremacy over the church, 
but now that supremacy is largely taken for granted in North America 
and western Europe. One must necessarily ask, is religion that is thus 
removed from the offices of final, legitimate exercise of social control 
and political power still at all the same thing as religion exercising final 
and absolute authority in matters of truth and government?
It is instructive to look at two contrasting styles of secularism, 
French and British, both premised upon the supremacy of the state 
over religion, but treating a common vexed issue in contrasting ways. 
That issue is the wearing of the veil by Muslim schoolgirls. According 
to French laïcité (like Turkish secularism), a public institution, such 
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as a school, cannot be a place where religious expressions are on dis-
play. Consequently, no veils are allowed. Here, the argument goes, all 
citizens are welcomed into a common French culture, but the price of 
admission is the surrendering of any aspect of identity that alienates 
one from that common culture. It represents the heritage of an Enlight-
enment value of replacing religion with a common, laicist national 
culture.
The British approach shows an interesting multiculturalist contrast. 
A legal case was adjudicated in England during the summer of 2007 
in which a state-funded school with a largely Muslim student body 
accommodated Muslim girls with a school uniform that included a 
modest head covering. A committee of parents and teachers agreed 
to this standard. One girl, however, thought this dress was not suf-
ficiently Islamic and claimed that in her version of Islam, she needed to 
be completely covered in a burqa—no face showing, no arms, etc. In the 
British version of this controversy, a multiculturalist accommodation 
of Muslim dress went so far, but then stopped. The girl lost her court 
case and was told to wear the school uniform or find another school 
(and there was in fact one for burqa-clad girls).
The British style of accommodation represents an interesting exam-
ple of what Cady calls the “interactive and pluralistic border zone 
between religious and secular discourses and practices.” One can 
attend state-funded but religious schools in Britain—there are Angli-
can, Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim schools. They are all tax-funded and 
tuition-free, yet also have school-sponsored occasions for the expres-
sion of sectarian piety. Such a policy would be unthinkable in France. 
According to the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, it would seem that Americans would also find it 
unthinkable, except for the fact that charter schools accommodating 
Islamic practice have nowadays become quite common, as we learn 
from Liza Baer’s essay in this volume. But even while religious values 
are invited into these British schools, the curriculum and system of 
examinations is in line with a national standard. We cannot imagine, 
for example, a case of a British school being allowed to challenge the 
theory of Darwinian evolution on religious grounds. The state retains 
the right and the power to exercise final authority in the matter of all 
religious accommodations.
Two quick conclusions present themselves:
2
Macalester Civic Forum, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/maccivicf/vol3/iss1/6
Jamew W. Laine
25
1.  If the government will accommodate a diversity of religious prac-
tices and ideas, where does it draw the line? This is the issue in Win-
nifred Sullivan’s brilliant book, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom.1 
She examines a Florida legal case over the degree to which a public 
cemetery should accommodate the religious devotional expressions 
(placing a variety of vertical decorations on graves) of persons prac-
ticing a wide diversity of traditions. She concludes that it becomes 
impossible for the state to determine what is a traditional practice 
required by a particular religion and what is simply a matter of 
individual, personal taste. As soon as the state (here represented 
by the judge making a ruling) decides what is actually required 
by a particular tradition, like Sunni Islam, or Greek Orthodoxy, or 
Reformed Judaism, he or she has taken over the role of theologian, 
normatively essentializing and standardizing a tradition that may in 
fact have enormous internal diversity.
2.  Both kinds of secularism (French and British) leave the state govern-
ment intact as the final arbiter. Religion occupies the space circum-
scribed by the political institutions that exercise legitimate power. 
One should note here how all manner of public institutions follow 
a calendar that is basically Christian but appears to the laicist as 
neutral, until such time as a follower of a religion rooted in a radi-
cally different culture asks to be recognized. And where would that 
lead? Can one imagine a school calendar that would accommodate 
the holidays of Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Seventh Day Adven-
tist Christians; Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist 
Jews; Sunni, Shi’i (Twelver and Ismaili) Muslims; Sikhs, Hindus, 
Zoroastrians, Pure Land Buddhists…?! Here the border between 
what we idealize in a Protestant way as the proper private space for 
religion, and the social fact of our living together in common institu-
tions, reveals itself to be highly contested.
Moreover, any religious expression, practice, or idea that crosses 
a line determined by secular political powers may very well be pros-
ecuted (for instance, polygamy or ritual drug use). That is to say, in a 
secularist society, the state, functioning as a putatively neutral adjudi-
cator between a variety of non-established religions, turns out to be not 
so neutral after all, but rather an institution embracing, and depending 
upon, an ideology that contains many of the same sorts of elements 
once contained in “The True Faith.” It stands in for the Holy Mother 
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Church, upholding doctrines so obviously true that we, the dominant 
majority population, take them for granted.
This is a rather harsher way of putting the case that Cady has made! 
The secular world—whether influenced by shared religious or nonreli-
gious values—has coercive power, the kind of coercive power wielded 
in medieval times by the Church. The most coercive discourse is one 
that remains masked and unmarked. Secularism has had that sort of 
role until challenged by some unlikely bedfellows:
1.  The conservative evangelical, decrying “secular humanism” as an 
ideology and quasi-religion that opposes Christianity;
2.  The follower of Islam or another religion whose practices conflict 
with the taken-for-granted practices of a dominant society that is 
not as “post-Christian” as secularists assume;
3.  The post-modern critic of the Enlightenment.
This unmasking is frightening, for when a certain “background” is 
assumed, a society can proceed on the basis of shared values, rhythms, 
etc. Once that is ripped apart, the very basis of legitimacy is unstable 
and the final arbiter becomes the one with the greatest military power, 
as in the case of the bloody European wars of religion.
Does our own world of bloody conflict signal a return to those days 
of uncertainty?
II. The Cure
This situation leaves us with some uncomfortable realities. For me, it 
will never be possible to fairly adjudicate between a host of religious 
traditions and cultures from a truly neutral space. The place of adju-
dication will inevitably be the place of final power. From that per-
spective, final authority has shifted from the Church to the State, and 
secularism stands in for The Faith. Cady, however, has adopted a more 
sanguine view, beginning with an optimism following the election of 
President Obama.
According to Professor Cady, Obama provides us with a new model: 
the “pluralistic, interactive border between religious and the secular…” 
Here there will be:
1.  Constitutional separation of church and state;
2.  Decoupling of religious and national identities; and
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3.  The “Democratic virtue of translating religious values and visions 
into more universal language that fellow citizens within a diverse 
society can understand.”
I argue that this new model simply demotes Christianity from the 
role of taken-for-granted faith informing the values declaimed as secu-
lar, and replaces it with something more inclusive, but still rather criti-
cal of traditions not embracing French Enlightenment virtues. Here, 
a broadly tolerant, Vedantic neo-Hinduism might fit nicely under the 
umbrella of this “universal language” whereas a strict constructionist 
Sunni legalism does not.
Cady also mentions the flexibility within our cultural discourse that 
seems to open up when individuals seek a “spirituality” rather than 
membership in an institutional “religion”: “Individuals increasingly 
shop the spiritual market place in their personal quest for a more tailor 
made religiosity.” This very capitalist bourgeois approach, however, 
cedes the really crucial issues of our shared public life to secular institu-
tions, like schools, courts, etc. Religion is then not politically intrusive. 
As “spirituality” becomes a dabbling in Tai Chi or a book group dis-
cussion of gnosticism or mysticism, it turns into something comfort-
ably unthreatening to the secularists who exercise real political power 
in the name of quasi-religious values like peace, freedom, democracy, 
gender equality, and tolerance (all praised even while waging war).
To open up public discourse to the wellsprings of religion while 
not privileging any one religion or type of religion sounds like a fine 
idea, but if we “decouple religion from national identity,” we will still 
have to forge some kind of national identity informed by religious or 
ideological tradition, and our powerful institutions will still operate 
in the name of that consensus, a consensus that will always favor some 
groups and marginalize and exclude others. To me that signals the victory 
of secularism, a victory 500 years in the making (according to Charles 
Taylor2). Secularism is not, perhaps, that neutral ground where all reli-
gions can gather, but the common ground where those religions that 
are willing to accept their dethronement from places of final legitimacy 
and authority can contend and fight for attention. It is the sovereign 
nation-state that claims final authority in all things, even if it is willing 
to make a place for some of the religions that are allied to its projects 
and purposes.
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